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A B S T R A C T
What has been the reaction of Kazakhstan toward the rising power and inﬂuence of Russia
since 1994? This paper uses the concept of soft-balancing, speciﬁcally analyzing econom-
ic issues using Stephen Walt’s balance of threats approach, in an analysis of Kazakhstan’s
relationship with Russia. It examines instances of Kazakhstan’s internal and external eco-
nomic soft balancing efforts vis-à-vis Russia to explain how it used economic tools to protect
its energy security from Russia.
After 1991, which marked the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union – the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including
Kazakhstan, needed to create an institution that could tackle economic and energy prob-
lems in the region. I argue that the Eurasian Union idea promoted by the president of
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was a skillful attempt to simultaneously maintain a close
cooperation with Russia and to soft balance against Russia’s inﬂuence through collabora-
tion with other CIS countries. However, that initiative failed and did not have the intended
economic soft balancing effect.
When Russia started asserting its economic and political power over the Central Asian
and Caspian regions, Nazarbayev once again resorted to the economic soft balancing policy,
but this time by relying on outside players. Part 2 of this article discusses two cases of such
external economic soft balancing efforts: participation in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline project, and the economic cooperation with Turkey as part of a free trade zone.
The BTC pipeline project and the close economic cooperation with Turkey ended up being
a more productive soft balancing effort than the earlier Eurasian Union initiative.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction
In 1991 the collapse of the Soviet Union and the forma-
tion of new states on its former territory was a historic
turning point. However, Moscow has not abandoned its at-
tempts to maintain inﬂuence over its former territories.
During the Yeltsin period, the nature of interactions between
Russia and the Central Asian countries, including Kazakh-
stan, was based on the postulate of “preserving its inﬂuence
in Central Asia by any means” (Mesheryakov, 2014) and “if
not as a global power, at least as a Eurasian power”
(Malashenko, 2013, p. 21).
This was especially dangerous for Kazakhstan, which is
the only Central Asian state sharing a long border with
Russia, and the only Central Asian state whose sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity were threatened by the presence
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of ethnic Russians in its northern regions. A number of re-
searchers have commented on the serious nature of the
ethnic situation, which has been a national threat.1
Nevertheless, there is no signiﬁcant literature on the
energy threat emanating from Russia. Being bothmajor pro-
ducers and exporters of rawmaterials, Kazakhstan and Russia
are competitors for foreign markets. In the early 1990s, Ka-
zakhstan opened joint ventures with foreign capital, which
enabled the country to ﬁnd newmarkets. Starting on the path
of political, economic self-development in 1994, Kazakh-
stan developed and deﬁned an independent economic
strategy as a sovereign state (Kazakhstan, 1994, p. 22).
Nazarbayev held that the export of rawmaterials and energy
resources was important for the economic development of
Kazakhstan (Nysanbaev & Dunaev, 2010, p. 14). However, as
Kazakhstan is landlocked between Russia and China, it did
not have any option but to export its oil through Russian ter-
ritory. Aware of this fact, Russia tried to dictate the terms of
price along their own lines and volumes supplies of Kazakh-
stan’s oil, which will be discussed in detail in Section 2.1.
Therefore, to protect its energy security, Kazakhstan started
to diversify its export routes through the Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline
Atasu–Alashankou. By diversifying its energy export routes,
Kazakhstan not only decreased its dependence on Russian
oil pipelines, but started to compete with Russia for foreign
markets. For instance, Kazakhstan joined the BTC pipeline to
compete with Russia for the European market and had a lot
of deals with China to earn its place in the sun before its com-
petitor Russia. According to the Kazakh scholar Laumulin,
“Threats to the economic independence of Kazakhstan include
economic factors which would weaken security, (…) which
would limit Kazakhstan’s presence in foreign markets”
(Laumulin, 1997, pp. 116–117).
Thus, Kazakhstan had to protect its security from the
threat posed by Russia. In this paper, I argue that the Ka-
zakhstan government was very concerned with protecting
its energy security from Russia, which had attempted to limit
the diversiﬁcation of Kazakhstan’s oil routes and cut off Ka-
zakhstan’s efforts to bypass Russian territory. As Alexander
Cooley noted, for Kazakhstan “happiness is multiple pipe-
lines” (Cooley, 2012, p. 9). The government of Kazakhstanwas
aware that it needed an economic tool that would allow for
balancing and at the same time strengthen its economic and
political position. This tool is called soft balancing, and with
its help Kazakhstan worked to strengthen its own capacities.
Over the past years, analysis of soft balancing has played
a critical role in understanding the behavior of weaker states
toward more powerful states. Advocates of the concept of
soft balancing offer a wide range of deﬁnitions. Some have
described soft balancing as a policy that pursues alliances
to obtain outcomes against the will of a dominating power
(Walt, 2005, p. 126). Others emphasize the nonmilitary tools
weaker states use to delay, frustrate, and undermine stron-
ger states (Pape, 2005, pp. 7–45; Paul, 2005, pp. 46–71).
Critics argue that the theory lacks the consideration of al-
ternative explanations for a state’s behavior vis-à-vis a
hegemon’s actions (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005, pp. 74–75).
They hold that it is not a new concept, that the same be-
havior occurred in earlier periods, and it is no more than a
normal diplomatic exchange, and not a response against the
unipolarity of a hegemon (Lieber & Alexander, 2005, p. 139).
However, the purpose of this article is not to argue for or
against the soft balancing theory, but rather to examine if
the theory can explain Kazakhstan’s strategy vis-à-vis Russia.
In this article I will apply Stephen Walt’s balance of
threats approach in combination with his soft balancing
theory, according to which states “join alliances to protect
themselves from states or coalitions whose superior re-
sources pose a threat” (Walt, 1987, p. 18). Walt identiﬁes
four factors that determine how threatening a state is per-
ceived by others, which are aggregate power, geographic
proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions by a
stronger state (Walt, 1987). Building on this, I would deﬁne
the following factors as signiﬁcant in understandingwhether
a state might become an energy threat: competition over
foreign markets and dependence on foreign countries’ oil
pipelines to export their own oil. Kazakhstan has a geo-
graphical proximity with Russia and they are members of
many common organizations, which make the soft balanc-
ing policy based on Paul and Pape’s deﬁnition,2 diﬃcult to
apply. In his book, which looks at soft balancing,Walt argues
that collaboration with others helps to improve one’s own
bargaining position in global negotiations, irrespective of
the issue, to gain privileges from greater powers (Walt, 2005,
pp. 126–129). Therefore, through economic cooperationwith
Turkey, Kazakhstan could improve its position at the bar-
gaining table when dealing with Russia.
AlthoughWalt’s soft balancing theory provides the con-
ceptual foundation for this study, Stephen Walt’s soft
balancing theory needs to be modiﬁed to ﬁt the case of Ka-
zakhstan. According toWalt, “states may balance externally,
by combining their capabilities with others, or they may
balance internally, bymobilizing their own resources in ways
that will enable them to resist stronger states effectively.
Or they may do both. In any case, the goal is the same: to
ensure that a more powerful state (or coalition) cannot use
its superior capabilities in ways that the weaker side will
ﬁnd unpleasant” (Walt, 2005, p. 120). In this framework, Ka-
zakhstan would be seen to be using both types of balancing,
which are called internal soft-balancing and external soft-
balancing. However, I argue that there is another kind of
internal balancing, which could be done within a larger
transnational organization, using the Eurasian Economic
Union as an example. Weaker states can bring a stronger
state into the organization and bind its inﬂuence through
common legitimacy and other constraining tools as a means
1 For instance, Pinar Ipek claimed that there was a potential threat to
Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity from ethnic Russians (Ipek, 2007, p. 1180).
Another researcher, Olivier Roy has emphasized the weight of the Russian
presence in Central Asia as being the result of Russian neo-imperialism,
and discussed the presence of substantial numbers of Russian military on
the border, as well as Russian irredentist claims over territory in north-
ern Kazakhstan (Roy, 2000, p. 190). Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse
have also looked into the inﬂuence of Moscow on Central Asian states,
arguing that these states “have become ‘victims’ of Russian – and Chinese
– authoritarian pressures” (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2013, p. 14).
2 According to Pape and Paul, soft balancing policy uses international
institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to oppose
a hegemonic power. For details on soft balancing, see Pape (2005, pp. 7–45)
and Paul (2005, pp. 46–71).
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of keeping the stronger state under control. To highlight the
legitimacy of this example, I draw attention to the initia-
tive for the establishment of Eurasian Union proposed by
the President of Kazakhstan, whichwas an attempt to control
Russia within this organization through cooperation with
CIS countries. Yet the Eurasian Union initiative failed because
the majority of the CIS countries feared losing their sover-
eignty. This question is analyzed in the ﬁrst part of this paper.
Since Putin has come into power, the foreign policy of
Russia has changed from a global to a regional focus. Russia
began to build up its military, economic and political po-
tential in the Central Asian region, which has led to the
emergence of such organizations as the Collective Securi-
ty Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Customs Union. In
the initial phase of the Customs Union, Kazakhstan started
to lose out the organization, while over the next few years
Russia increased its inﬂuence in the energy and other sectors.
To decrease the strong inﬂuence of Russia, Nazarbayev once
again resorted to soft balancing, by forming strong bonds
of cooperation with such outside actors as Turkey. The BTC
pipeline, which bypasses Russian territory, has been vital
to Kazakhstan improving its bargaining position with Russia,
which has led to an increase in Kazakhstani oil transit
through the Russian Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).
Moreover, by diversifying its routes, Kazakhstan can
strengthen its energy security. In effect, Kazakhstan was able
to gain some leverage in its relationship with Russia, which
is discussed in more detail in Section 2.
Economic strategy plays an important role in this bal-
ancing act. This paper studies and analyzes the economic
approach of soft balancing policy used by Kazakhstan in its
relationships with Russia, and attempts to explain the ben-
eﬁts of the economic tools that could be employed for
pursuing its energy interests. This paper is signiﬁcant because
there has so far been no research conducted on the appli-
cation of soft balancing theory in the case of Kazakhstan.
2. Kazakhstan’s internal soft balancing against Russia
through the Eurasian Union initiative
2.1. Nazarbayev’s Eurasian Union initiative
The state of the global economy and geopolitical pro-
cesses in theworld has brought about another trend– the need
for integration, especially in the case of CIS countries, which
hold a unique geopolitical and geographical position. On the
one hand, CIS countries needed the union to protect their in-
terests in the complex global world, surrounded by the
European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), as well as countries to the south, such as Iran, Af-
ghanistan, India, which are sometimes described a potential
tinder boxof unrest. On theother hand, PresidentNazarbayev’s3
main foreign policy goal has been to use economic soft bal-
ancing toweakenRussia’s inﬂuence in the region and to attract
investment from abroad, especially Europe.
Kazakhstan, like other CIS countries, in the face of the
geopolitical situation, has been forced by to consider the
positive and negative sides of globalization processes. Pos-
itive aspects can be characterized as – modernization and
development of the economy, expanding horizons, while the
negative include – loss of culture, inequality, poverty, the
threat of terrorism and drug traﬃcking. These ideas were
presented by Nazarbayev in his book The Critical Decade
(Nazarbayev, 2003a), in which the author reveals the
dilemma that arises when faced with globalism, analyzes
the problem of threats to national security, the spread of
extremism and terrorism in the country. Kazakhstan, at that
time, was not only a young state, but also a weak one in
terms of economics due to the sudden break down of eco-
nomic relations with CIS countries, which the people carried
the burden of. It was a diﬃcult period in the history of the
state. It was necessary to ﬁnd a new way, a happy medium.
Thus, in 1994, Nazarbayev proposed the creation of a Eur-
asian Union, to include former Soviet states, based on the
model of the European Union. His conceptwas based “on vol-
untary, equal integration into the political and economic co-
development of the post-Soviet states” (“Oﬁtsial’nyi sayt
Prezidenta,” 2014). Initially, this initiative had only limited
success for the reason that, as Dugin argues in his book The
Eurasian Mission of Nursultan Nazarbayev (2004), during that
time, a lack of awareness of major world processes meant
that the political class in Russia and in CIS did not adequately
grasp themeaning and intent of the project, with liberals re-
jecting it due to ﬁnancial concerns and nationalists opposing
it because of nationalistic concerns (Dugin, 2004).
Such outlooks were present in other CIS countries, but
as there were differing degrees of willingness to cooper-
ate, they had to look for other, closer forms of cooperation
(Kononovich, 2004) that in the end led to the signing of the
Agreement on Free Trade Area on April 15, 1994 by the Presi-
dents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
However, this process has advanced very slowly; it was
not until October 18, 2011, that a Treaty onMutual Trade Area
was signed in Saint Petersburg after ameeting of the Council
of Heads of Governments of the CIS countries (“Dogovor o
zone,” 2011). In recent years, the idea has been revived, and
the Eurasian Economic Union has been in effect since January
1, 2015. There has been considerable doubt and opposition
toward the initiative among the former Soviet states, but
Nazarbayev used the concept of Eurasianism to persuade the
doubters of the beneﬁts of creating a Eurasian Union.
When and why did Nazarbayev made the proposal?
Many observers have linked Nazarbayev’s initiative to
create a Eurasian Union with a lecture he delivered at
Moscow State University (Sultanov, 2010). However,
Nazarbayev actually mentioned the need to create a new
integrated union as a “trial balloon” during a visit to the
United Kingdom a week before his Moscow talk. Speaking
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs on March 22,
1994 in London, Nazarbayev said: “The development of the
post-Soviet area is now deﬁned by two trends: the forma-
tion of the national statehood, and the move toward the
integration of CIS countries” (Bisenbaev, 1994).
3 Came to power in December 1991, the start of independence of Ka-
zakhstan, and in April 2011, Nazarbayev was re-elected to another ﬁve-
year term.
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Among the CIS countries, Kazakhstanwas one of themost
tightly integrated into the Soviet economy. Kazakhstan’s
mineral wealth was based in single-enterprise towns
dependent on production chains which involved suppliers
and end-users elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. The
whole oil industry in western Kazakhstan relied on Russian
pipelines (Pomfret, 2005). Nazarbayev said of this situation,
“The export of energy resources is themost important income
for our governments. Therefore, in the interest of all member
states, there is a need for a single export policy system for
the CIS countries” (Nazarbayev, 2003b). Nazarbayev wanted
to use a united export policy system to offset the inﬂuence
of Russia when it came to energy resources. He noted, “I have
called for the establishment of a ‘Eurasian Union’ having
studied the experience of different integration organiza-
tions, in particular the European Union” (Nazarbayev, 2004).
Therefore, in April 2004, his suggestions to attract CIS
countries into joining a Eurasian Unionwere as follows (from
an April 2, 2004 speech of Nazarbayev, 2004):
1. Integration must only be pragmatic, based primarily on
economic feasibility;
2. Integration can bemultileveled and have different speeds
in accordance with the economic development of each
member-country;
3. Collective regional security must be assured;
4. Integration must be voluntary.4
It appears that the main motive for the initiative was to
achieve equal partnership between Russia and the other post-
Soviet countries. Nazarbayev hoped that the Union could help
create a balance in regard to Russian power through the pres-
ence of binding supranational authorities that can act freely,
as in the European Union. In this regard, for many coun-
tries, including Kazakhstan, the process of internal soft
balancingmight become critical, especially in terms of entry
into the Eurasian Union. To prove the use of internal soft bal-
ancing toward Russia within a Eurasian Union and its
effectiveness, I will analyze the idea of the European Union
as Nazarbayev put forward in his Eurasian Union initiative.
2.2. Internal soft balancing – as an instrument of
international relations – a comparative perspective looking
at the example of the European Union
Initially, the idea of the European Union was to prevent
wars breaking out between states and to promote justice.
The decisions made by the European Union would be
binding upon its member states (Damian & Adam, 2007).
This approach, known as the “Schuman Declaration,” pre-
sumes that integration must be gradual and provide the
merger of integral interests on the basis of economic
uniﬁcation (Munte, 2008). Former Prime Minister of Ka-
zakhstan, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, said in a speech in 1996:
The dynamic interaction between the leaders of France
and Germany set the course for European uniﬁcation and
in the process avoided the oppression of one country over
another, as well as the possibility of one country gaining
greater rights ahead of another. Experience in the in-
ternational arena shows that differences in economic
development and the level of consumption between de-
veloped and developing countries can create deep
antagonism that can be further fueled by rich coun-
tries exploiting the poor (Kazhegel’din, 1996).
By studying the history, economy, political system and
the future prospects of the EU, we can see the use of in-
ternal soft balancing. Internal soft balancing is aimed at
reducing the role of individual states within the frame-
work of integration, uniﬁcation and supranational
community, as is evident with the case of Germany.
Kazhegel’din commented that there was an imbalance in
Russia’s relationship with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and
further pointed out that Yeltsin made a remark in Minsk
stating that Russia was at the epicenter of relations between
CIS countries (Kazhegel’din, 1996, p. 9). It seems such point
of views exist even today. Thus, Shkvarya in his article,
“Russia in the integration processes in the post-Soviet area:
modern features” (2009), wrote that the CIS’s trade and in-
tegration processes are primarily linked with Russia, and
that as such despite the leaders of CIS countries holding a
ﬂexible and multi-vector policy, Russia still has the poten-
tial to strengthen its position in the post-Soviet area
(Shkvarya, 2009).
However, in 1991 the leader of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev,
declared that “Kazakhstan will not be anybody’s underbel-
ly” (Kazhegel’din, 1996, p. 9). This notion is clearly evident
and consistent in his approach nowadays. Kazakhstan has
been actively involved in integration processes since inde-
pendence. The country’s ﬁrst move toward integration was
its involvement with the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which was established on December 21, 1991,
and then in 1999 Kazakhstan entered the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Community, and in 2003 – the Common Economic
Space. Nazarbayev’s integration projects did not involve the
incorporation of one country into another and considered
the options of agreement, which provided for strong su-
pranational structures objectively diminishing the political
opportunities of any one country. This principle was em-
bedded in the concept of the Eurasian Union as a basic
postulate (Kazhegel’din, 1996, p. 9). According to Nursultan
Nazarbayev, the main principles of the integration at all
stages should be based on economic cooperation, despite
the efforts of Russia to strengthen the political component
of the integration. The economic component of Eurasianism
from Kazakhstan’s point of view should be based on the
ideological foundations of the European Union (democra-
cy, market openness, equality) and is contrastedwith Russian
perception of “openness.” Kazakhstan needs Russia to ﬁnd
new markets, and the Eurasian Union is the path to mod-
ernization of Kazakhstan, the introduction of new and
innovative technologies that will allow Kazakhstan to
provide an internal soft balancing through its economic
4 Nazarbayev explained voluntary in this sense as: “This is a principle
point. Different scenarios of forced integration are good only at ﬁrst glance.
If regional organizations were really based on the principles of the ‘Iron
Curtain,’ economic autarky, and today’s globalization would easily break-
down such barriers. Any integration that is not completely voluntary is
going to be quickly destroyed. Real integration can only be achieved if it
is based on a voluntary system, with the respective states having a clear
understanding of each member state’s national interest.”
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development. The future of the Eurasian Union depends on
Kazakhstan and Belarus. Being the special components of
the Eurasian Union, they force Russia to change the strat-
egy, which should correspond to such concepts of union as
“innovative project” and “equal union.”
2.3. Factors that prevented the implementation of internal
soft balancing
When considering Nursultan Nazarbayev’s initiative to
create a Eurasian Union, it is necessary to mention the re-
jection of his idea by some CIS countries, which delayed the
time of integration for nearly 20 years. According to the Pres-
ident Nazarbayev:
The idea of the Eurasian Union was launched by a clear
understanding that CIS could not be the only form of in-
tegration in the post-Soviet area. The project was based
on the awareness that in the coming years, the CIS coun-
tries will not be able to enter into developed economic
blocs as equal partners. And this has happened. The
overly optimistic expectations of such incredible break-
throughs in economic zones with such different
technology and infrastructure are evident today
(“Evraziyskii Soyuz,” 1996).
The CIS member-states had different approaches to inte-
gration processes. The foreign policy of such countries as
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan until now has emphasized the
bilateral relations without joining the unions and associa-
tions with supranational authorities. One of the obstacles in
the development of integration within the CIS was the issue
regarding the role of states in decision-making by consensus,
whichhindered thedevelopment of integrationprocesses. Neg-
ative aspects of the CIS, according to experts, are “its
formlessness,” its unclear agenda and the freedom of imple-
mentation or non-implementation of CIS summit decisions”
(Nikulichev, 2002). Nazarbayev claims that CIS countries, in
terms of their economies, were damaged by inconsistencies
in export commodity policy (“Evraziyskii Soyuz,” 1996). This
problem has led to an understanding of the establishment of
the association as the Customs Union, which was created by
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1995. The Customs Union
became the basis of integration of these countries. As noted
by Vladimir Putin, “the Customs Union has boosted turnover
by 50% to 66, 2 billion dollars” (Putin, 2014). For the CIS coun-
tries that took the opposition position, it became obvious that
the Eurasian Economic Union is a regional association of three
quarters of industrial, and two thirds of agricultural produc-
tion of the whole CIS (Isingarin, 2001). Despite old Soviet
thinking that is an attempt to reestablish the Soviet Union pre-
vented the use of internal soft balancing.
In addition, the new idea of Eurasian Union provoked two
different kinds of negative reactions. Some Russian com-
mentators feared it would lead to a loss of the country’s
inﬂuence. The Russian journalist Vitaliy Portnikov noted that
many in the Russian political establishment had a nega-
tive position toward the Eurasian Union idea as it means
the “end of the inequality within CIS and a push against the
inﬂuence of Russia” (Portnikov, 1994). Conversely, smaller
Central Asian states feared the initiative would cause them
to lose their independence. President Saparmurat Niyazov
of Turkmenistan was reported to have rejected the initiative
as “doubtful and contradictory, with the danger of recre-
ating the Soviet experience” (Aziya, July 1994, №28).
Because of opposition like this, the ﬁrst 1994 initiative to
create a new integration association failed and resulted in
a smaller scale economic integration, called the Common Eco-
nomic Space of ﬁve countries, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, and Tajikistan on February 26, 1999. Nevertheless, this
opposition was related to the old concept of Eurasianism,
whereas Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism was about achievement
of economic beneﬁts through economic cooperation among
all CIS countries, an open ﬁeld for attraction of investments
in the economy of the partner-states, to strengthen their se-
curity and balance the inﬂuence of Russia.
Individual statements of the opposition within the CIS
have not stopped the process of integration. Nazarbayev has
actively contributed to the signing of a Treaty on the es-
tablishment of the Eurasian Economic Community on
October 10, 2000 in Astana. It addressed issues of cooper-
ation and the abolition of customs duties within the
member-states. The next step was the signing of the Joint
Statement of the legally binding Customs Code of the
Customs Union on July 6, 2010. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan joined
the Customs Union. Nursultan Nazarbayev (2009) in his
article “Eurasian Economic Union: Theory and Reality” an-
nounced the next steps of integration.
The Common Economic Space became a reality, which
was created on December 8, 2010. As a result, 17 oﬃcial
documents were signed that regulated the Common Eco-
nomic Space (Nazarbayev, 2009). To regulate the processes
of integration, the presidents of three countries signed the
Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration and the Treaty
on the Eurasian Economic Commission on November 18,
2011. On January 1, 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union –
a new geopolitical “pole” of the modern world began
(“Evraziyskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya,” p. 7).
Nazarbayev believes that this union will initiate coopera-
tion with Western countries, which will lead to an increase
of foreign investment in Kazakhstan.
2.4. Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism and the stages of economic
integration
Nazarbayev used established ideas of Eurasianism as a
way of gaining support among other CIS countries. However,
his concept differed from the classic concept of Eurasianism
as espoused by the 20th century Russian philosopher-
founder of Eurasianism and linguist Nikolai Trubetzkoy who
published on Russia’s superiority over European culture
(Trubetzkoy, 1997). Nazarbayev in contrast emphasized that
his Eurasianism is based on equality rather than Russian
domination, and downplaying the animus against theWest.
Nazarbayev’s basic idea of Eurasianism, as elucidated in his
book The Strategy of Independence, held that “The Eurasian
Union is a union of equal independent states, aimed at the re-
alization of the national interests of each member-state and
developing each state’s integration capabilities” (Nazarbayev,
2003b). In addition, Nazarbayev offered to carry out the Eur-
asian integration on the principle of “equal partnership of all
member-states, following common ruleswithout any periph-
ery or center.”His idea is far from the “imperialist Eurasianism,”
96 L. Nurgaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 92–105
in which “integration” would be supported by armed force.
Kazakhstan renounced nuclear weapons, banned nuclear
testing, and participates in multilateral regional security or-
ganizations. Nazarbayev’s Eurasian integration supposes proﬁt
for each participant. This differs signiﬁcantly from empires,
where there is always amain beneﬁciary, while the rest suffer
(Verkhoturov, 2010, pp. 272–275). Another difference between
classical Eurasianism and Nazarbayev’s 1994 version is the
absence of an animosity toward the West. Nazarbayev
promoted active interactionwith Europe. He noted: “The par-
ticipation of theWestern countries in the integration processes
in Eurasia could be beneﬁcial for Kazakhstan” (Verkhoturov,
2010, p. 276). In 1999, three countries of the Customs Union
(Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus) were encouraged (driven) to
conclude anAgreement on theCustomsCode and theCommon
Economic Space, to proceed towards the construction of a
common market. On May 23, 2000, in Minsk, the leaders of
the CustomsUnion countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia)
supported Putin in the formation of an eﬃcient economic or-
ganization,whichwas called theEurasianbasedona suggestion
fromNazarbayev. A fewmonths later, on October 10, 2000, an
agreement was signed concerning the formation of the Eur-
asian Economic Community (EAEC). Since its formation, the
Customs Union has ceased to exist. The main purpose of the
Eurasian Economic Community was to ensure free trade and
the formation of the Common Economic Community. This re-
quired the revision of customs duties, tariffs, and subsequently
a new Customs Union was created in 2006, which operates a
common customs tariff. In July 2010, theUniﬁedCustomsCode
was introduced, and in July 2011, Customs inspections were
imposed within the Union. On November 18, 2011, the Dec-
laration on the Common Economic Space was signed, and on
May 29, 2014, the Treaty on the establishment of the Eur-
asian Economic Union was implemented. What factors
stimulated this process? First of all, the growth ofmutual trade,
which amounted to over $64.1 billion in 2013 (94.5% com-
pared to 2012) and $13.2 billion (87, 4%) for the 1st quarter of
2011. Total GDP in 2012–2014 increased from $2.3 trillion to
$2.7 trillion (“Istoriya ekonomicheskoi integratsii,” 2014).
The basis of the Eurasian Economic Union as an eco-
nomic union is based on the classic model of integration
as described by the American economist Bela Balassa
(Balassa, 1975), which has 5 stages of international eco-
nomic integration from the lowest to the highest:




― Full Economic Integration
Kazakhstan in the framework of the Eurasian Union relies
on:
― Its competitive advantage to attract investments and co-
ordinated ﬁnancial policy;
― Lower commodity prices by reduction of transport costs;
― An increase of production by increasing demand for
goods;
― An increase of the market and recoupment of new tech-
nologies (Ageev, Bayshuakov, & Kuroedov, 2007).
With regard to beneﬁts for Kazakhstan in the Eurasian
Union, ﬁrst of all, an increase of transit-transport poten-
tial and the possibility of access to the Russian market, with
further diversiﬁcation of the economy of Kazakhstan. We
should not forget that the Kazakh–Russian economies are
tightly integrated. Thus, Deputy Director of the Institute of
Eurasian Studies, Zhanat Momynkulov notes that the “Eur-
asian Union is a temporary integration process and after
the entry of Kazakhstan to the WTO and the integration of
the international economic environment, the effect from the
union will decline. This is due to the fact that our econo-
mies are mutually competing” (Momynkulov, 2014). One of
the problems to be solved is the difference in economic de-
velopment. For example, in Russia (“Ministerstvo Finansov
Rossiyskoi Federatsii,” 2014) and Kazakhstan
(“Ezhemesyachnii analiticheskii otchet,” 2014) exports
prevail over imports, but in Belarus (“Ministerstvo
Inostrannih Del Respubliki Belarus”), the opposite is true
(“Godovoy Doklad,” 2013). Investments could be long-
term measures, as well as joint projects of the three
countries. Sergei Glazyev, Advisor to the President of the
Russian Federation, noted that the main task is to ﬁll the
common economic space with investments (“Evraziyskii
soyuz sozdayot,” 2014). In the framework of the Interna-
tional Investment Forum, which was held on September 20,
2014 in Sochi, the Director of the Department of Industri-
al Policy of the Eurasian Economic Commission V. Maltsev
noted that the development of industrial parks in the Eur-
asian Economic Union can attract foreign investments
(“Edinaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya”). This direction is
being actively developed in Kazakhstan too. Kazakhstan is
developing active cooperation not only with countries of the
Eurasian Union, but also withWestern countries to gain the
foreign investments from them.
2.5. Foreign investment as a transition to an external soft
balancing
While working toward a Eurasian Union on one hand,
Nazarbayev also tried to improve his country’s economic
independence by trying to attract foreign investment. After
independence, Kazakhstan’s oil companies and process-
ing plants were in critical condition. Due to lack of ﬁnancial
resources, many Kazakhstan enterprises went bankrupt. To
revive the energy sector, Nazarbayev went on the offen-
sive to attract investments. In 1996, he established the State
Committee on Investments. In 1997, he formulated a Law
on State Support of Direct Investment, and established pri-
ority sectors for attracting domestic and foreign direct
investments (Nazarbayev, 1997, p. 12).
To reduce the dependency on Russia, Nazarbayev worked
to create a favorable environment for foreign investors. After
independence, the main factor in the formation of foreign
policy of Kazakhstan was geopolitical: its lack of access to
the open seas, geographical proximity to Russia, China, and
the Islamic world, and its location in the heart of Eurasia
gave the country a possibility of acting as a link between
the East and the West within the Eurasian continent. Nev-
ertheless, due to global changes, foreign policy of Kazakhstan
has shifted more in the direction of economics. The evi-
dence for this is the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic
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of Kazakhstan for 2014–2020, approved by the President
Nursultan Nazarbayev on January 21, 2014 (“Ukaz Prezidenta
RK,” 2014). In this document, it is written that the multi-
vector policy has become more heavily inﬂuenced by
pragmatism and realism, the desire to maintain a balance
between the big powers in the international arena and
protect national interests. The Republic of Kazakhstan will
deepen the comprehensive strategic partnershipwith Russia,
China, the United States, European countries, Japan, Korea,
Turkey and Iran, and will give priority to widen interna-
tional relations with other countries to attract foreign
investments and new technologies. The result of this policy
was to increase the share of foreign investments. The total
volume of foreign direct investments into the economy of
Kazakhstan amounted to $180 billion. According to the Di-
rector of the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry of
Economy and Budget Planning of Kazakhstan Alia
Alimbetova “our country is amongst the most attractive in
the world for foreign investments” (Akhmetbekov, 2014).
In addition, she added that the major investors in Kazakh-
stan are the Netherlands, Germany, USA, UK, France, Italy,
Russia, China, Canada, Switzerland and Japan. According to
Alimbetova, "the main trade partners of Kazakhstan are the
EU countries (41% of the total), Russia (17. 9%), China (17%),
Switzerland (4.1%), Ukraine (3.3%). Turnover from these
countries by the end of 2013 amounted to about $ 132
billion for Kazakhstan.” (Mukhtarov, 2014).
The main bulk of investments (58. 8%) is directed to the
development of industry in Kazakhstan. There has also been
a 3.4 times increase of foreign investment into the manu-
facturing industry. The real growth of investment into ﬁxed
capital grew by 8.5% in Kazakhstan, and in Russia by 0.1%.
One of the measures to attract foreign investment into Ka-
zakhstan is the reduction of the reﬁnancing rate, which was
reduced from 7% to 5.5%. This rate is the lowest among the
countries of the Eurasian Economic Space (Investitsii, 2013).
Aswe can see, Kazakhstan uses foreign investment to advance
industry, the development of transport, and by doing so,
reduces its dependence on the Russian economy. In support
of this trend, recent data show that investments in ﬁxed
capital into Kazakhstan in the January–August 2014 period
amounted to 3.699 trillion Tenge, which is 5.7% more than
during the same period in 2013 (Kapital, 2014).
Sagintayev has suggested that the multi-vector policy
ensures that there is nothing in the Eurasian Economic Union
Treaty preventing new agreements being formed with third
countries and international organizations. He goes on to note
that export increased by 10.3% and that within the manu-
facturing sector, the volume of FDI increased by 37.5%
(“Evraziyskaya integratsiya pozvolila,” 2014). As we can see,
Kazakhstan used foreign investments as a transitional mech-
anism to activate external soft balancing. In the second part,
I will examine Kazakhstan’s use of external soft balancing
as a way to counterbalance Russia’s power.
3. Kazakhstan’s external soft balancing policy vis-à-vis
Russia
As said before, the weaker states can balance a stron-
ger power by collaborating and forming a union with other
countries. However, as Nazarbayev’s vision of the Eurasian
Union remained far off, and attempts of the internal soft bal-
ancing against Russia were unsuccessful, Nazarbayev decided
to change his approach and focus on the “external soft bal-
ancing” efforts to offset Russia’s political power. The external
soft balancing typically refers to an economic cooperation
of a weaker state with outside actors to counterbalance the
power of a strong neighbor. Based on realist theories of
world politics, Stephen Walt argues that states join each
other to balance against the hegemonic power and he sup-
ports his argument with the words of Kenneth Waltz:
‘As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics
abhors unbalanced power. Facedwith unbalanced power,
some states try to increase their own strength or they
ally with others, to bring the international distribution
of power into balance.’ States may balance externally, by
combining their capabilities with others to ensure that
a more powerful state (or coalition) cannot use its su-
perior capabilities in ways that the weaker side will ﬁnd
unpleasant” (Walt, 2005, p. 120).
I have organized the study of two speciﬁc cases by ﬁrst
analyzing the premises behind Kazakhstan’s decision to join
the BTC project, and by exploring additional export oil transit
systems, followed by the discussion of the BTC project and
such alternative export oil transit systems as part of Ka-
zakhstan’s external soft balancing policy vis-à-vis Russia,
as well as Russia’s reaction. Then, I focus on a second case
study, looking at Kazakhstan’s external soft balancing mea-
sures vis-à-vis Russia (i.e., Kazakhstan’s attempt to bring in
Turkey as a member of the Kazakhstan–Russia–Belarus
customs union).
3.1. Premises for Kazakhstan’s decision to look for
alternative oil export infrastructures, such as the BTC
pipeline that bypass Russia
Russia has been the principal foreign policy partner of
Kazakhstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
In 1992, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an Agreement of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Tokaev,
2008, p. 14). These two countries, the largest powers in the
CIS region, are the co-founders of the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC or EAEC). They also collaborate under
the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
and the Conference on Interaction and Conﬁdence-Building
Measures in Asia (CICA). The two countries also partici-
pate in multilateral negotiations on the legal status of the
Caspian Sea. One of the main areas of the Kazakhstan–
Russia collaboration is oil transit. According to an IMF report,
over half of Kazakhstan’s total exports comprise oil exports,
and oil production represents one-ninth of Kazakhstan’s
gross domestic product (Coronel, Rozhkov, & Raman, 2011,
p. 27). However, Kazakhstan has had to rely primarily on
Russia for such oil exports.
On June 7, 2002, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an Agree-
ment between the Government of the Russian Federation
and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Oil
Transit, which gave Russia the ability to signiﬁcantly control
the oil that Kazakhstan exports transported through Russia.
According to Article 5 of the agreement, “The destination
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and amount of Kazakhstan’s oil transit will be determined
by the Russian authorities […], and approved by the con-
gruent decision of the Government of the Russian
Federation” (The Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in
the Russian Federation, 2013).
Recently, however, Kazakhstan has been exploring other
oil transit options to gain more independence in its oil
exports (Dautov, 2007, p. 12), thereby raising Russia’s level
of concern regarding the possibility of losing its inﬂuence
over Kazakhstan, with its wealth of oil, uranium, and other
valuable natural resources. The Russian political analyst
Tomberg suggests that the notion of Kazakhstan becom-
ing a major independent energy-exporting country that
pursues its own interests is Russia’s greatest concern
(Tomberg, 2007). This, in its turn, is resulting in growing ten-
sions between Russia and Kazakhstan. A Kazakh expert, D.
Satpaev, noted on this point, “There is no long-term a strat-
egy for the future bilateral partnership [between Russia and
Kazakhstan] as there are still signiﬁcant tensions and short-
sightedness exist between the two countries” (Satpaev,
2007). In the Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, V.
Panﬁlova noted that Kazakhstan was looking for new oil
export opportunities to bypass Russia. Panﬁlova has quoted
theMinister of Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan U. Karabalin speak-
ing at the Government Hour in Parliament, as saying
“Kazakhstanwill have to consider different options. Themain
traﬃc caused by sanctions against Russia will be in the
Caspian direction through Azerbaijan” (Panﬁlova, 2014). In
January–February 2014, the quantity of transported oil via
BTC reached 489.5 thousand tons (Butyrina, 2014). Limited
Liability Company “Kazmortransneft” provided for an in-
crease in shipments of oil to 400 thousand tons per month,
which is evidence of Kazakhstan’s policy to use the BTC as
a tool for reducing dependence on Russia. The signiﬁ-
cance of this pathway is even more evident in light of new
geopolitical events. In Baku on September 20, 2014, the
signing of the Contract of the Century was held, while at
the same time the foundations for the Southern Gas Cor-
ridor were laid out (“V Baku sostoyalas’,” 2014). At this
meeting, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev said: “The
diversiﬁcation of routes in order to maintain energy secu-
rity along the pipelines – is a joint activity of producing and
transporting to and from consumer countries.” Later on Sep-
tember 29, Nazarbayev and Aliyev noted: “There is the
potential for further development of relations and expan-
sion into different areas” (“Azerbaydzhan i Kazakhstan,”
2014).
3.2. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) project
In November 2002, the Kazakhstan’s oil company,
“Kazmunaigaz”, and the State Oil Company of the Azerbai-
jan Republic initiated negotiations on Kazakhstan’s potential
participation in the BTC project. The BTC pipeline was built
to transport oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea
for shipment to the West. It was opened on May 25, 2005,
at the Sangachal Terminal near Baku by President Ilham
Aliyev of the Azerbaijan Republic, President Mikhail
Saakashvili of Georgia, and President Ahmet Sezer of Turkey,
with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, and the
United States Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman also in
attendance (“Giant Caspian oil,” 2005). Initially, this project
was boosted by the US to ensure that neither Russia nor Iran
developed a monopoly over pipelines from the Caspian
region (Morningstar, 2003).
Source: BTC Co. (Website of International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group, 2006).
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In 2006, the Agreement on the Promotion and Support of
Oil Transportation from Kazakhstan to International Markets
through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan by means of the BTC
pipeline (“Heydar Aliyev Heritage,” 2010) not only opened up
a newway to export Kazakhstan’s energy, but also fostered a
close relationshipwith Turkey. In addition, aswell as support-
ing theBTCproject, Kazakhstan asserted its independence from
Russia and solidiﬁed its “multi-vector” foreign policy.
This caused a wave of serious concern over Russia’s role.
Although the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through Georgia prob-
ably could increase the possibility of the Russian export
earnings going up as a result of the reduction of conges-
tion in its own export pipelines, as was pointed out by Paul
Gregory, a Professor of Economics at the University of
Houston, in the September 7, 2008 issue of The Washing-
ton Times. Russia was also at risk of losing its strong “political
stranglehold on the Western markets” (Gregory, 2008). As
it was further noted in the RussCaspWorking Paper (Guliyev
& Akhrarkhodjaeva, 2008, p. 6):
[t]he West has promoted transportation projects that
would carry Caspian energy bypassing the Russian ter-
ritory, such as the BTC, whereas Russia has used its power
to keep almost all Central Asian energy exports under
control and to prevent any major shift in Central Asian
energy exports. The region, thus, has been a playground
for Russian-Western rivalry over the access to the vast
Caspian resources and control of the exporting routes.
Hence, from the very beginning, Moscow showed its irri-
tation anddispleasure over the constructionof theBTCpipeline,
a pipeline that would bypass Russian territory. Russia argued
that the pipeline would be unproﬁtable and that Kazakhstan
should use the Russian pipeline system instead (“Rossiya
proigrala nefteproekt,” 2005). However, in spite of Russia’s neg-
ative forecastswith respect to the viability of the BTC pipeline,
in July 2006, the BTC pipeline was successfully put into oper-
ation, pumping over 25 million tons of oil annually. In 2008,
the capacity of the BTC pipeline was increased by up to 50
million tons, which created strong competition to the Russian
oil transportation system thereby severely undermining Rus-
sia’s attempts of dominating the oil transportation routes from
the Caspian region (Dautov, 2007, p. 12).
Consequently, fearing the loss of its political and econom-
ic inﬂuence over Kazakhstan, with its vast volumes of oil from
the Caspian Sea reserves, Russia decided to soften the previ-
ously “agreed” conditions of theKazakhstani oil transit through
Russia by signing the Protocol Between theGovernment of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on November 18, 2009 and the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation on Amendments to the
Agreement of on Oil Transit on June 7, 2002 (The Embassy of
the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation, 2013).
The protocol contemplated a survey on the prospects for in-
creasing the carrying capacity of the Atyrau (Kazakhstan)–
Samara (Russia) oil pipeline from 15 to 25 million tons of oil
per year for transportation in the direction of the Black Sea or
the Baltic Sea or in the direction of the western border of the
Russian Federation (The Embassy of theRepublic of Kazakhstan
in the Russian Federation, 2013).
It could be argued that the softening of Russia’s oil export
control measures in response to Kazakhstan’s decision to
participate in the BTC project exempliﬁes a successful use
on the part of Kazakhstan of external soft balancing
measures vis-à-vis Russia. In effect, Kazakhstan was able to
gain some leverage in its relationship with Russia.
In addition to the BTC pipeline, which was a westbound
oil transportation alternative, Kazakhstan started collabo-
rating with China on the construction and utilization of an
eastbound oil pipeline that would also bypass Russia
(Overland & Kjaernet, 2011, pp. 137–138). The energy-rich
Kazakhstan has been exporting its crude oil to China through
the newly built Atasu–Alashankou pipeline since 2006.
3.3. Eurasian Union
Russia’s efforts to exert inﬂuence over Kazakhstan and keep
it under controlwerenot limited tooil exports controls. Another
way inwhich Russia attempted to establish its dominance and
control over Kazakhstan, and other CIS countries, was through
theEurasianUnion– a signiﬁcantlymodiﬁedversionof the Eur-
asian initiative originally proposed by Nazarbayev.
In October 2011, Vladimir Putin – then Russia’s prime
minister, and now the president of Russia, revealed an ini-
tiative to establish a Eurasian Union of the former Soviet
countries (Saari, 2011) in the hope of continuing to main-
tain control over the post-Soviet region using mass media.
He promoted the meaning of “Eurasianism,” downplaying
the Russia-centric nature of the term. Putin might have also
hoped the initiative would enhance his credibility in the up-
coming Presidential elections.
The Russian newspaper, Izvestiya, published an article by
Vladimir Putin, “The New Integration Project for Eurasia –
A Future that is Born Today,” in which he argued that, on the
basis of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Com-
munity, there was a chance to unite the countries of the CIS,
which could be amajor player in the international arena, with
Russia as the “heartland.” Putin claimed that his proposed
EurasianUnionwould not be a re-creation of the Soviet Union,
but rather an integration of countries and that it would be
an “economic, political and value-based” union that re-
ﬂectsmodern realities (“Novyi integratsionnyi proekt,” 2011).
Aleksandr Dugin, a political scientist and a leading ide-
ologist on the creation of a Eurasian empire, suggested that
the strengthening of Russia’s inﬂuence on the CIS countries
was an important step in Russia’s foreign policy. He noted
that the instigation of the joint economic projects between
Russia and the CIS countries on the public and private levels,
as well as state control of big private businesses were nec-
essary to create a program in accordance with Russia’s
geopolitical interests (Dugin & Dobrenkov, 2010).
While the reasons for Russia’s desire to create Eurasian
Union seem to be clear, the reasons for Nazarbayev’s agree-
ment to join a Russia-centric Eurasian Union were not
unequivocal. There were different opinions regarding the ra-
tionale for Nazarbayev’s decision to agree to join the Eurasian
Union. According to one opinion of Kanat Berentaev, the
Deputy Director of the Center for Public Policy Research, the
development of economic cooperation in the post-Soviet era
is a necessity and Kazakhstan had no other choice if it
wanted to avoid becoming a peripheral state. Berentaev
wrote: “Kazakhstan is now facing an ambiguous choice: will
it try to preserve its formal sovereignty, at the risk of being
marginalized in world development, or will it be actively
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involved in the integration process?” According to Berentaev,
the potential for joint scientiﬁc, technological, and re-
source production could help Kazakhstan to be one of the
major actors in the world economic system, competing on
an equal basis with the United States, the countries of the
Eurozone, and China (Berentaev, 2012, p. 8).
The preservation of sovereignty is the main issue for Ka-
zakhstan. In 2012, in Yalta, a conference was held “Eurasian
vector of development: Problems andProspects”. Talking about
the supranational institutions, Oganesyan gave an example of
the articlewrittenbyyoung researcherMirzahanyan, called “Su-
pranational: fromEurope toEurasia”,whereMirzahanyan raises
the issue of sovereignty and supranational (Oganesyan, 2012,
10). Next, Galina Povazhnayawrites that Russia should active-
ly use ‘soft power’ in Eurasia through its policy toward Eurasian
EconomicUnionmember-states (Povazhnaya, 2012, pp. 11–17).
In this regard, Kazakhstan faced a problem: to enter into a Eur-
asian EconomicUnion, butwithout losing its sovereignty,while
directing efforts to survive in a diﬃcult geopolitical situation.
Unfortunately, Kazakhstan had an unfavorable experience in
the Customs Union. After the establishment of the Customs
Union,which increasedeconomic eﬃciencyonly for theRussian
businesses, Kazakhstan’s balance of trade deﬁcit rose. In 2012
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The Kazakhstani government also started realizing that
Putin’s Eurasian Union idea, despite its loud joint interest
and common good proclamations, was simply a means for
implementing Russia’s hegemonic ambitions.
In fact, I strongly believe that the Customs Union and the
Eurasian Economic Union in the form proposed by Russia
were meant, not only as tools for expanding economic in-
ﬂuence, but also as ameans of establishing political inﬂuence
over Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region. Russia used
Belarus as a doorway into Eastern Europe, and is using Ka-
zakhstan as a doorway into Central Asia and China. Since
2014, Russia exports up to 7 million tons of oil through the
Kazakhstan pipeline (Atasu–Alashankou) (Karsybekov, 2013).
In Chapter 4 of Bykov’s book,National Interests and Foreign
Policy, it is noted that “the projection of national interests on
foreign policy is interpreted through pragmatism to adapt to
the changing global environment” (Bykov, 2010). Consider-
ing that it is diﬃcult for Kazakhstan to count on full beneﬁcial
cooperationwithin the framework of the Eurasian Union, it is
necessary to use other unions because Kazakhstan’s economy
is smaller than Russia’s economy. Thus, Kazakhstan’s inter-
ests arenot fully taken into account.NursultanNazarbayevonce
again resorted to external soft balancing to counterbalance Rus-
sia’s overpowering inﬂuence by initiating talkswith Turkey on
joining the Customs Union and subsequently the Eurasian
Union. This is discussed in further detail below.
3.4. Cooperation with Turkey as a soft-balancing measure
Firstly, why did Nazarbayev choose to turn to Turkey to
counterbalance Russia? This decision can ﬁrst be ex-
plained by Turkey’s geopolitical location. From a strategic
point of view, Turkey is located at an intersection of the
North-South and East-West transport corridors lying in close
proximity to the countries of Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and
the Middle East. Moreover, the choice could be explained
by the current tense relationship of Turkey and Russia as
a result of Turkey’s restrictions on the right of passage for
the Russian tankers seeking passage through the Bospo-
rus and Dardanelles (Vasiliev, 2010, p. 2) in an attempt to
minimize the oil transportation traﬃc through the Straits.
Most importantly, Turkey is a major competitor of Russia
in the Black Sea region. Turkey and Russia have considered
their inﬂuence in the Black Sea region as central to their status
as regional powers in the post-ColdWar era (Tanrisever, 2012,
pp. 2–8). In Turkey, the Black Sea has come to be viewed in-
creasingly as a shipping corridor that could open up
alternative transportation and trade routes to Eastern and
Northern Europe, as well as to the Caucasus and Central Asia
(Vasiliev, 2010, p. 2). Oktay F. Tanrisever argues that while
Russia’s policy toward Turkey aims at increasing Ankara’s ‘de-
pendence’ on Moscow in strategic areas, such as energy,
Ankara’s policy toward Moscow seeks to promote a greater
‘interdependence’ between these countries in question.
Another important concern for Russia, in Tanrisever’s
opinion, was the energy issue that created the basis for re-
gional rivalry with Turkey. The position of Russia has been
to try to keep the post-Soviet states in the Caspian Sea region
(i.e., Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan) under its
sphere of inﬂuence by making them dependent on Rus-
sia’s transportation systems for oil and gas exports
(Tanrisever, 2012, pp. 2–8). However, Turkey and Russia have
encountered profound disagreements over transportation
routes for the hydrocarbon energy supplies of these post-
Soviet states in the Caspian Sea region (the Baku-
Novorossiysk, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, and Nabucco pipelines).
There are also other issues – outside of the scope of this
article – fueling the rivalry between Russia and Turkey, in-
cluding Turkey’s support for the territorial integrity of
Georgia, and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh con-
ﬂict in favor of Azerbaijan (Markedonov & Ulchenko, 2011).
Another potential reason justifying Kazakhstan’s choice of
Turkey is that it is the fourth biggest foreign investor in Ka-
zakhstan after the US, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
Turkey is number one on the list of countrieswith the highest
number of companies that have invested foreign capital in the
Kazakhstan economy (Kanbolat, 2011).Moreover, as the result
of Nazarbayev’s visit to Turkey in October 2012, the Kazakh-
stan Bank of Development and Eximbank of Turkey signed a
Memorandumof Understanding for the opening of a credit line
of $250 million. In addition, Kazakhstan and Turkey signed a
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plan to implement New Synergy joint economic programs
aimed at increasing bilateral trade from $3.3 billion in 2011 to
$10 billion in 2015. Even prior to this initiative, the economic
partnership between the two countries has been steadily in-
creasing. For instance, if in 2010 the trade turnover amounted
to $1.85 billion, in 2011 it rose to $3.3 billion. Turkey has in-
vested, from 1993 to 2012, up to $1.8 billion into Kazakhstan’s
economy (“Nachalsya dvukhdnevnii oﬁtsial’nyi,” 2012). Addi-
tionally, Turkey invested $263 million into the development
of oil and gas ﬁelds in Kazakhstan (Chebotarev, 2014). The
Turkish capital is involved in LLP “Kazakhturkmunai,” which
extracted 227.468 thousand tons of oil in 2010.
In addition to all of the above, Kazakhstan and Turkey have
similar approaches tomany international and regional issues,
as well as the common roots in language, history and culture.
Based on ethno-cultural aﬃnity and practical considerations,
Kazakhstan chose to follow the Turkish model of develop-
ment to overcome its economic problems during the initial
stages of its post-Soviet independence. Kazakhstan has also
madegenuine contributions to the organizationof the Summits
of the Heads of the Turkic Speaking Countries and played an
important role in the foundation of the Cooperation Council
of the Turkic Speaking Countries (Turkic Council) and the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Turkic Speaking Countries
(“Relations Between,” 2015). In 2008, a protocol was signed in
Antalya at the establishment of the Parliamentary Associa-
tionof Turkic-speaking countries (“VAntalii podpisanProtokol,”
2008). The ﬁrst summit of ‘The Cooperation Council of Turkic
Speaking States’was held onOctober 21, 2011 inAlmaty,which
also saw the approval of the Declaration, which deﬁned the
principles and directions of Kazakhstan’s cooperation with
Turkey and Azerbaijan.
In light of the foregoing reasons, Kazakhstan from the very
beginning of its development of bilateral relationswith Turkey
considered Turkey as a counter-balancing power to Russia.
Accordingly, the choice fell on Turkey as a candidate to open
up a free trade zone in the Customs Union as an attempt to
simultaneously counterbalance Russia’s inﬂuence within the
union and to gain a strong ally within the Customs Union
framework. On July 21, 2014, Turkey offered to establish a
free trade zonewith the countries of the Customs Union. This
was announced byMinister of Economic Development of the
Russian Federation Aleksei Ulyukaev (“Turtsiya predlozhila
otkryt’,” 2014). Talgat Mussabekov, the senior analyst of the
Agency of the Return on Investment Research noted, “the cre-
ation of a free trade zone for Turkey with Customs Union is
a positive signal for Kazakhstan, because of the potential
market for Kazakh exporters, and the increase in vectors and
centers of power in free trade zonewith Russia and Belarus.”
The existence of Turkey will provide more opportunity for
Kazakhstan to maneuver in the negotiation process
(“Kazakhstan vyigraet ot sozdaniya,” 2014).
Source: The original map has been retrieved from Gamze and Tayfun (2014) with the arrows added by the author (http://www.elsevier.com/connect/
kazakhstan-invests-in-science-for-economic-growth).
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4. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to understand what Kazakh-
stan’s reaction was toward the rising power and inﬂuence
of Russia in the region. Kazakhstan is the second largest
country in the post-Soviet territory; it possesses vast energy
reserves and is in close proximity to Russia. As such, Ka-
zakhstan is compelled to employ soft balancing policy to
keep the overpowering inﬂuence of Russia in check, while
at the same time maintaining cooperation and a close
working relationship with its neighbor.
The case studies discussed in this article show that
weaker states can counterbalance the strength and clout of
powerful nations through collaborating and forming unions
with other states. However, the internal soft balancing efforts
concerning the growing inﬂuence of Russia, which were un-
dertaken as part of the Eurasian integration initiative
proposed by Nazarbayev in 1994, proved unsuccessful. In
contrast, some of the subsequent external soft balancing
efforts in respect to Russia’s overpowering inﬂuence, for
example, participation in the BTC pipeline project and
turning to Turkey as a potential partner and ally in the
Customs and Eurasian Unions, seem to have already reaped
more fruitful rewards in keeping Russia from gaining dom-
inance in the Central Asian and Caspian regions.
Furthermore, the BTC pipeline, which bypasses Russian ter-
ritory, is the most prominent example of Kazakhstan’s
success in improving its bargaining position with Russia, as
it was there that Kazakhstani oil transit increased through
Russian CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium). Furthermore,
if Kazakhstan was to diversify its routes, the country could
strengthen its energy security.
This paper has sought to demonstrate that soft balanc-
ing theory can explain the strategy of opposition that
Kazakhstan has employed vis-à-vis Russia, that is to say that
a theoretical framework can help clarify empirical ﬁnd-
ings. There has been no research conducted into the
application of soft balancing theory in the case of Kazakh-
stan regarding the “Eurasian Union,” therefore, this article
can function as a signiﬁcant contribution to the as yet un-
derstudied ﬁeld.
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